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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ERIC PINO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 20010205-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the warrantless search of Pino's bag constituted an illegal search that was 
not justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution? Specifically, Pino argues that his consent to search the 
bag was not valid because it was not attenuated from the officer's exploitation of an 
illegal seizure. Nor was the search justified under an "officer safety" exception to the 
Fourth Amendment protections against such unreasonable searches and seizures. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
State v Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). Likewise, the trial court's 
ultimate decision that the consent was voluntary or involuntary is also reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
1 
This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress, a suppression hearing, and at 
trial (R. 40-49, 66-67, 127, 129 at 49-50). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Eric Pino appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth 
District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Eric Pino was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or about 
June 30, 1999, with Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R. 1). An 
amended information which changed the date of the offense was filed on December 2, 
1999 (R. 21). 
On February 14, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn 
W. Davis at which time Pino was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of 
probable cause (R. 30-31, 126). In addition, Pino was arraigned and a plea of "not 
guilty" was entered (R. 126 at 38). 
On March 27, 2000, Pino filed a Motion to Suppress requesting the suppression of 
evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 40-49). On 
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August 7, 2000, a suppression hearing .was Jield and Pino's motion was denied by Judge 
Davis (R. 66-67, 127 at 27-28). Pino renewed the motion to suppress at the begginning 
of trial and the motion was again denied (R. 129 at 49-50). 
On November 16, 2000, a jury trial was held with Judge Davis presiding (R. 82-
84, 129) and Pino was convicted by the jury as charged (R. 104). 
On February 5, 2001, Judge Davis sentenced Pino to thirty-six months probation 
and ordered him to complete the substance abuse program at First Step House (R. 110-12, 
128). 
On February 28, 2001, Pino filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
119). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 19, 1999, Provo City Police Officer Ron Hughes was on day shift patrol 
(R. 129 at 65). At approximately 1:30-2:00 p.m. Hughes spotted a vehicle driven by Pino 
(R. 129 at 66). Based on a hunch, Hughes ran a computer check on the vehicle which 
showed an expired registration—although the license plate showed a current registration 
decal (R. 129 at 67, 79). Hughes followed Pino into a lot behind the Greyhound Bus 
Depot in Provo, pulled directly behind Pino, got out of his car, and approached Pino-
who was still seated alone in his vehicle, a 1982 Chevy (R. 129 at 67-68). Pino was 
effectively boxed in because of a cement blockade in front of his vehicle (R. 129 at 79). 
Hughes asked Pino for his drivers license, car registration and proof of insurance 
on the vehicle (R. 129 at 68, 79). Pino gave Hughes a Utah I.D. card and said that he did 
not have a drivers license and had recently purchased the vehicle but had not yet 
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registered it in his name nor obtained insurance (R. 129 at 68). Hughes returned to his 
vehicle to prepare a written citation and vehicle impound form (R. 129 at 69-70). 
While Hughes was in his vehicle preparing the citation, Mark Robinson, another 
Provo City officer, voluntarily responded to the location (R. 129 at 88-89). Robinson 
testified that he would take his directions from Hughes, who was the primary officer, and 
that he was there to provide backup for reasons of officer safety (R. 129 at 89). Robinson 
approached Pino, who was seated in the driver's seat, and spoke with him (R. 129 at 89-
90). 
Robinson said that he recognized Pino and knew him from numerous prior 
meetings (R. 129 at 89; R. 127 at 6). Robinson testified that while he was working with 
the Utah County Narcotics Task Force a few years ago he served two separate search 
warrants on Pino's residence for methamphetamine (R. 126 at 25; R. 127 at 6). Drug-
related items were found in the home during the searches (R. 126 at 25). 
During the execution of the second search warrant, Robinson testified that he had 
a conversation with Pino on the telephone (R. 126 at 25). Pino was not present at the 
home but called while the officers were there and Robinson answered the phone (Id.). 
Pino was upset about the warrant and "made threats" to kill all of the officers present at 
the execution including Robinson if they did not "get out of [his] house" (R. 126 at 26; 
R. 127 at 8, 13). This conversation took place at the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998 
when Robinson worked with the narcotics task force (R. 127 at 10-11). Robinson had no 
contact with Pino between the phone conversation and the traffic stop approximately 15-
18 months later (R. 127 at 14). 
Robinson testified that because of the previous threat made by Pino, he was 
concerned about officer safety during the traffic stop (R. 126 at 26). Robinson testified 
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that Pino was extremely "mellow", "sedate" and "calm" which caused him to suspect that 
Pino was under the influence of narcotics or paint fumes as Pino worked as a painter (R. 
126 at 36; R. 127 at 16). While Hughes was working on the citation and vehicle 
impound, Robinson maintained contact with Pino (R. 126 at 27). 
As Robinson spoke with him, Pino voluntarily exited the vehicle and the two 
continued to converse next to the car (R. 126 at 33). During the conversation, Robinson 
asked Pino if he was still "involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine" (R. 
126 at 28). Pino denied any current drug involvement (Id.). 
While Robinson spoke with Pino, Hughes continued to complete the citation and 
impound form—including a vehicle inspection and equipment check (R. 129 at 71-72). 
Hughes testified that he gathered information from Pino for the traffic citation and vehicle 
impound form while Pino sat in his vehicle (R. 126 at 16). Pino was informed that the 
vehicle would be impounded and that he could take any personal property of value with 
him (R. 129 at 72; R. 126 at 18-19). According to Hughes, it was in response to this 
information that Pino exited the car and grabbed "a gym bag that was in the car beside 
him" (R. 129 at 72). Hughes testified that he does approximately a hundred impounds a 
year and that it was his standard practice to search the personal belongings people remove 
from their vehicles if he has a suspicion of criminal acitivity (R. 129 at 81). Hughes 
testified that he had no suspicion that the gym bag Pino removed from the vehicle 
contained illegal contraband (R. 129 at 81-82). 
At this point, Pino was not yet free to leave because all of the paperwork had not 
been completed (R. 126 at 19). At some point, Pino was given the citation for failure to 
register the vehicle, no insurance, and suspended driver's licence and was given a date to 
appear in court (R. 129 at 80; 126 at 17-18). The citation (Defendant's Exhibit #4) is 
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signed by Pino and has the time of citation listed as 1:55 p.m. A copy of the citation is 
included in the Addenda. Pino was also given a vehicle impound report (Defendant's 
Exhibit #5) which is also included in the Addenda. Hughes testified that after the paper 
work was completed Pino was free to leave (R. 129 at 82). 
Very close in time to when Pino was given the citation and impound report, 
Robinson asked Pino for consent to search the bag he had removed from the car (R. 129 
at 81). The bag was big enough to conceal a weapon (R, 127 at 18). Pino consented to 
the search and small plastic baggies—one of which contained a white powder residue-
were found by Robinson (R. 129 at 72-73, 91; R. 127 at 18). Based on the contents 
found in the bag and probable cause of drug possession, Hughes then conducted a search 
of Pino's person and two other baggies which contained a powdery substance were found 
(R. 129 at 76, 82; R. 126 at 9-10, 22). The residue found in the plastic baggies tested 
positive for methamphetamine at the State Crime Lab (R. 129 at 132). No weapons were 
found in the bag or Pino's person (R. 127 at 18). 
Pino was no cited for drug use at the time of the traffic stop nor was he arrested on 
any charges (R. 126 at 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pino asserts that the search of his constituted an illegal and unjustifiable search 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of the search. Specifically, Pino asserts the following: One, that the 
continued detention of Pino while he was asked to consent to the search of his bag 
exceeded the scope of any permissible detention and was unsupported by reasonable 
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sjispicioo of criminal activity that was independent of the initial detainer. Two that 
Pino's consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary nor was it attenuated from the 
illegal detention. Three, that the trial court erred m its conclusion that the search of 
Pino's bag was justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
protections. Finally, Pino asserts that the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion that there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation which required suppression of the evidence obtained 
from the continued detention of Pino and the search of his bag and his person is incorrect 
and requires reversal by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PINO'S BAG CONSTITUTED 
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S 
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. "Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5 
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments...." State v. Case, 884 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 
S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979)). While an individual has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
while in a vehicle." State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, 
it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has resulted in an/'automobile exception" to 
the warrant rule which allows officers the ability to "temporarily detain a vehicle and its 
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occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purposes of condufeting^a-
limited investigation of the suspicion." State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at ^[10, 13 P.3d 576. 
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop this Court must consider two questions: 
"[W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)). The inquiry as to the 
first question focuses on whether the stop was "incident to a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). Pino 
concedes that Hughes was constitutionally justified in initiating stopping his vehicle for 
investigation of an expired registration. 
The focus of the second question is "whether the stop was reasonably related in 
scope to the traffic violation which justified it in the first place." State v. Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353 at Tf 11, 17 P.3d 1135, cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001) (citing 
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 657). "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). In addition both the 
"length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 
763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1868). Pino asserts that the 
police exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and that any evidence obtained as 
a result of the search of Pino's bag or his person must be suppressed because they were 
obtained by an unlawful detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
of other criminal activity. 
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A. The police exceeded the scope of any.permissible-detainer. 
Once, the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated, the police were obligated to 
release Pino from his detention and allow him "to proceed on his way, without being 
subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, any "[i]nvestigative 
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of 
more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer[s] at the 
time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
Pino asserts that the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated when he signed and 
received the citation for the traffic offenses and the vehicle impound report; and that he 
should have been allowed "to proceed on his way without being subject to further delay" 
by the officers for additional investigative questioning. This proposition is supported by 
the testimony of Officer Hughes that Pino, in his mind, would be free to leave once the 
paperwork was completed (R. 129 at 82). 
However, Pino continued to be detained and seized because the officers' conduct 
failed to communicate to him—or any reasonable person—that he was free to decline their 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 
(Utah 1994). One, neither officer actually informed Pino that he was free to leave. Two, 
in almost immediate proximity to Pino's receipt of the citation and impound report he 
was questioned by Robinson about consent to search his bag R. 129 at 81). Three, this 
request to search came on the heels of Robinson's investigative questioning of Pino 
concerning his employment and past/present drug use (R. 129 at 89-90; R. 126 at 28, 33). 
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Accordingly, because Pino continued to be seized by.the officers, any additional 
questioning by the officers subjected him to further delay and had to be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Pino asserts that Officer 
Robinson's investigative question-which was asked "about the same time" Pino was 
given the citation and impound report—and which sought consent to search Pino's bag 
was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity (R. 129 at 81). 
The fact that Pino had a prior history of drug narcotics is insufficient to signal a 
current involvement in criminal activity. Nor does his "calm", "mellow" and "sedate" 
demeanor establish that Pino was presently undertaking any criminal activity. Blood shot, 
glazed eyes and a calm, cooperative behavior should not lead a reasonable officer to 
suspect the influence of drugs. State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) 
(holding driver's evasive behavior when questioned, and blood shot eyes, did not provide 
reasonable suspicion for detention exceeding scope of traffic stop). Moreover, Officer 
Hughes testified that he had no suspicion that Pino was involved in criminal activity or 
that his bag contained any illegal contraband (R. 129 at 81-82). 
Accordingly, Pino asks that this Court find that the officers exceeded the scope of 
any permissible detainer when they continued to detain and question Pino without 
reasonable suspicion once the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated; and that all 
evidence obtained as a result of this continued seizure must be suppressed. 
B. Pino's consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary was obtained by 
police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
A warrantless search is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the State 
can establish that it falls within one of the "few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citation 
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omitted). One of said established exceptions is consent. Id. However, "[A] defendant's 
consent to search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment 
only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) 
the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353 at % 18 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262). Pino asserts that his consent 
to the search of his bag was not voluntary and that it was obtained by Officer Robinson's 
"exploitation of a prior illegality." State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 440 (Utah App. 1996). 
1. Pino's consent was not voluntary. 
In State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996), this Court adopted the following 
analytical framework in order to determine whether the State had met its burden of 
proving that consent was voluntarily given: One, there must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and specific. Two, the consent must have 
been given freely and intelligently and obtained without duress or coercion either express 
or implied. Three, "every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights" must be indulged and there "must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at [^18 (quoting Ham, 910 P.2d at 439). 
In making this determination this Court looks at "the totality of the circumstances." Id. 
(citation omitted). In addition, the ultimate conclusion as to the voluntariness of the 
consent is reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
Pino asserts that his consent to the search was not voluntary under the criteria 
established in Ham. Pino concedes that there is positive testimony that his consent was 
specific and unequivocal. However, Pino argues that the consent was not freely and 
intelligently given nor was it given free of duress or coercion—express or implied. Pino's 
case is very similar to Hansen and Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). 
11 
In Hansen, the defendant was stopped for no insurance and an improper lane 
change. After the officer warned Hansen of the insurance requirement and returned his 
license and registration, he asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the 
vehicle. After Hansen indicated that no such items were present in the vehicle, the officer 
asked Hansen for permission to search the vehicle and Hansen consented. 2000 UT App 
353 at Tf2, 4. In Robinette, the defendant was stopped for speeding for which he was 
given a verbal warning before the officer returned his license. Immediately after the 
return of the license, the officer asked the defendant about the presence of illegal 
contraband in the car such as drugs or weapons. When the defendant denied the presence 
of such items, the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle and the defendant 
granted the request. 685 N.E.2d at 764. In this case, Pino was asked for consent to 
search his bag almost contemporaneous to receiving the citation and vehicle impound 
report (R. 129 at 81). Moreover, almost immediately prior to the request to search—just 
prior to his receipt of the citation, Officer Robinson had questioned Pino about any 
current involvement with narcotics (R. 126 at 27-28). 
Pino urges this Court to follow Hansen and Robinette and conclude that "every 
reasonable presumption" in this case weighs against the waiver of his fundamental 
constitutional rights; and that the suspicious question concerning current drug 
involvement asked by Officer Robinson near the time of his request to search combined 
with the fact that the request to search and subsequent consent came just as Pino was 
illegally detained after receiving the citation and impound report indicate that "the 
circumstances surrounding the request to search made the search subtly coercive." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at fflf 24-25. Accordingly, Pino requests that this Court 
conclude that his consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary. 
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2. Pino's consent to search was obtained through exploitation of illegal 
police conduct. 
Should this Court conclude that Pino's consent was voluntary, Pino asserts that his 
consent is still not constitutionally valid because it was obtained through police 
exploitation of prior misconduct. Pino has already established that his continued 
detention once he was cited for the initial traffic violations exceeded the scope of any 
constitutionally permissible detainer. "If voluntary consent follows police misconduct, 
the State must establish 'the existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent 
was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. Ham, 910 P.2d at 440. 
Factors this Court must examine in regards to this issue are: One, the temporal 
proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question. Two, the presence of 
intervening circumstances. Three, the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal misconduct. 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 440 (citations ommitted). Pino asserts that all of these factors weigh 
against attenuation in this case. 
One, the proximity between the illegal detention after he had been cited for the 
traffic violations and his consent to search is very short. Almost contemporaneous to the 
time Pino was given the citation and impound report and should have been free to leave, 
Robinson continued his detention of Pino and asked him for consent to search the bag he 
had removed from the car (R. 129 at 81). 
Two, like the facts in Ham, there were "absolutely no intervening" circumstances 
between the illegal detention and the consent. 910 P.2d at 441. 
Three, Pino asserts that the purpose of the continued illegal detention—and the 
purpose of Robinson's desire to search the bag-was an obvious attempt to find evidence 
that Pino was still involved in narcotics use without any reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause. Officer Robinson at preliminary hearing testified that immediately prior to Pino's 
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removal of the bag from the car and his request to search, he had a conversation with 
Pino "about whether or not he was still involved in the use or distribution of 
methamphetamine" (R. 126 at 27-28). During the conversation Pino was "very sedate" so 
Robinson was concerned that Pino could be under the influence of narcotics or paint 
fumes (R. 126 at 28, 36; R. 127 at 16). Robinson also used such adjectives as "calm" and 
"mellow" to describe Pino's demeanor during the detention (R. 126 at 36; R. 127 at 16). 
Robinson testified that because of the threat made against him by Pino approximately 15-
18 months previous during a phone conversation when Pino was agitated and consent, 
and more specifically, "because of the conversation [Robinson] had with him and his 
stating he is no longer using or dealing, [Robinson] asked him if he minded if [Robinson] 
looked in his black bag" (R. 126 at 28).1 
Pino also asserts that Robinson's misconduct in continuing to detain him so that 
consent could be obtained to search of his bag in order to find evidence of ding activity, 
was flagrant. Robinson had no reasonable suspicion—let alone probable 
cause—to suspect present criminal activity by Pino. The fact that Pino had a prior history 
of drug narcotics is insufficient to signal a current involvement in criminal activity. Nor 
does his "calm", "mellow" and "sedate" demeanor establish that Pino was presently 
undertaking any criminal activity. Moreover, Officer Hughes testified that he had no 
suspicion that Pino was involved in criminal activity or that his bag contained any illegal 
contraband (R. 129 at 81-82). 
^ino will address the issue of "officer safety" in the next section and demonstrate that 
the trial court erred in finding that the search of his bag was justified under such an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures? 
14 
Based upon these facts, Pino asks that this Court conclude that his consent was not 
attenuated from the illegal detention and Officer Robinson's misconduct and that it 
cannot be used by the State to validate the warrantless search of Pino5s bag. 
C. The trial court erred in concluding that the search of Pino's bag was justified 
under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
The trial court denied Pino's motion to suppress because he concluded that the 
search of Pino's bag was justified for reasons of "officer safety" (R. 127 at 27-28). 
Specifically, the trial court alluded to previous dealings between Robinson and Pino, a 
prior threat made by Pino against Robinson, and the fact the Robinson believed that Pino 
could have been under the influence of drugs because he was in "some sort of stupor" and 
had a "glaze in his eyes" (R. 127 at 27). Pino asserts that the trial court erred in this 
conclusion and that the search of his bag was not justified under the Fourth Amendment 
pursuant to an "officer safety" exception. 
Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny, a frisk or search for weapons 
for officer safety following an investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible if: One, a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which is interpreted in light of his experience as 
an indication of possible criminal activity and present danger; and two, there is nothing in 
the initial stages of the encounter which serves to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for 
his own or other's safety. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). 
Pino asserts that Robinson's warrantless search of his bag was not supported by 
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently dangerous or that there were 
* 
weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38 (Utah 1989). 
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Accordingly, the search of his bag was not justified as under the "officer safety" 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches. 
One, "nothing about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated 
prompted a conern for safety... [and] nothing [Pino] did, by way of conduct, attitude or 
gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Orme, J. dissenting in Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah App. 
1992)). The underlying offenses consisted of three benign traffic violations. In addition, 
Pino's demeanor was calm, mellow and sedate and not agitated, nervous or upset. 
Two, the threat made by Pino against Robinson took place during a phone 
conversation where Pino was very upset approximately 15-18 months prior to the stop (R. 
127 at 10-11). Moreover, Robinson had no contact with Pino during the intervening 
months (R. 127 at 14). 
Three, if Robinson really feared for his safety because of the prior threat, he would 
have immediately questioned Pino about the threat and the presence of weapons, or 
would have immediately had Pino exit the car and conducted a Terry frisk. Instead, 
Robinson conversed with Pino while he was seated in the vehicle, allowed Pino to exit 
the vehicle without any frisk, and continued to converse with Pino outside the vehicle (R. 
129 at 89-90; R. 126 at 33). Robinson never questioned Pino about weapons or the 
threat. Robinson questioned Pino about narcotics involvement. 
Four, Officer Hughes—who was the primary officer—did not testify as to any 
officer safety concerns. To the contray, Hughes testified that he had no suspecion of Pino 
carrying illegal contraband in the bag (R. 129 at 81-82). Furthermore, Pino removed the 
bag from the car at the direction of Hughes (R. 129 at 72; R. 126 at 18-19). 
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Robinson's warrantless search of Pino's bag was not supported by "reasonable and 
articulable suspicion" that he was presently dangerous or that there were weapons 
present. Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137-38. Pino asks that this Court correct the trial 
court's conclusion that warrantless search of Pino's bag was justified under an "officer 
safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against such searches. 
Pino further asks that this Court order that all evidence obtained from the 
warrantless search of Pino's bag-including the evidence obtained by Hughes' search of 
Pino's person because of the narcotics found by Robinson during the search of the bag-
be suppressed as fruits of a poisonous tree. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Pino asks that this Court reverse his conviction of 
possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone; and that the matter be remanded to 
the Fourth District Court with instructions that the evidence is to be suppressed and the 
matter dismissed as a matter of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7_ day of August, 2001. 
Margaret ^/Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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DAVID S. STURGILL (7995) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, UT 84601 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
&H 'u i i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC PINO, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 991402809 
Judge Lynn BI$18tON # J ^ L 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant ERIC PINO, by 
and through counsel, David Sturgill, Utah County Public Defenders Association, submits this 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS and accompanying MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
DATED this T? 
<H-
day of March, 2000. 
David S. Sturgill 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered this 2C day of March, 2000, a copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO SUPPRESS to the following: 
Kay Bryson 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
££*. 
DAVID S. STURGILL (7995) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC PINO, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 991402809 
Judge Lynn ^VfcStfON # 3 
_ . . — _ _ — _ _ _ _ _ , _ — . — . _•____•_____-, 
The Defendant, ERIC PINO, by and through his Attorney of record, David Sturgill, Utah 
County Public Defenders Association, submits this MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
FACTS1 
1. On May 19, 1999, Provo City police officer Ron Hughes stopped Mr. Pino's vehicle due 
to a traffic violation—the vehicle's registration was expired. PHT, 7. 
2. Officer Hughes spoke to Mr. Pino and discovered that he was operating the vehicle 
without a valid driver's license, and that the vehicle was uninsured. PHT, 8. 
3. Officer Hughes explained to Mr. Pino that although he would only receive a citation, his 
vehicle would be impounded. He also informed Mr. Pino that he could "take anything of 
The facts related in Defendant's Motion to Suppress were gathered from Defendant's preliminary 
hearing conducted Februrary 14, 2000. Facts from the hearing are cited in the following manner: PHT 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript), page number. 
value that [he wanted] with [him] out of the car." PHT, 18. Once Officer Hughes had 
completed the citation, Mr. Pino began to gather items that he intended to leave with, 
including a black gym bag. PHT, 17-18. 
4. Officer Robinson, also with Provo City, arrived to the scene shortly after the initial traffic 
stop. Officer Robinson told Officer Hughes that "he knew [Mr. Pino] and knew that he 
had a drug past." PHT, 9. 
5. Officer Robinson then approached Mr. Pino and "had a conversation about whether or not 
[Mr. Pino] was still involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine." PHT, 28. 
Mr. Pino responded that he "had put all of that behind him and he was no longer doing 
that" PHT, 28. That conversation lasted "three [or] four minutes." PHT, 33. 
6. Officer Robinson testified that during their conversation, he observed that Mr. Pino's 
eyes were "glazed over and bloodshot." PHT, 35. Officer Robinson also testified that 
Mr. Pino was sedate, calm and cooperative. PHT, 36. As a result, Officer Robinson 
suspected Mr. Pino was under the influence of a controlled substance. Officer Robinson 
did not, however, conduct any field sobriety tests to confirm or dispel that belief. PHT, 
35. 
7. Officer Robinson then observed a black gym bag that Mr. Pino removed from his vehicle, 
and "asked [Mr. Pino] if he minded if [he, Officer Robinson,] looked in [the] bag." PHT, 
28. Mr. Pino allegedly consented and handed the bag to Officer Robinson. PHT, 28. 
Inside the bag, Officer Robinson allegedly discovered several small baggies that appeared 
to contain a controlled substance. PHT, 29. 
8. At that point, Officer Hughes asked Mr. Pino to empty his pockets. PHT, 10. Mr. Pino 
allegedly "took out of his pocket a small fuse box and attempted to . . . drop it down the 
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back of his shirt, at which time [Officer Hughes] retrieved [it.]" PHT, 10. The fuse box 
"contained a baggy with white powder." PHT, 10. 
9. Mr. Pino was then arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and drug 
paraphernalia. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED AND STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT 
INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Article I, section 14 of Utah's constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution contain identical language; both provide: 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.] 
Although identical, these two provisions have not always been interpreted the same way. The 
Utah Supreme Court recently determined that "[w]hile [our] interpretation of article I, section 14 
has oflen paralleled the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction 
where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens." State v. 
DeBooy, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 13, f 12 (2000). 
Neither constitutional provision prohibits all seizures, but only unreasonable ones. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Also see State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 657 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). Under Terry, to determine whether a seizure is reasonable involves a two-pronged 
analysis: (1) Whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) Whether the 
officer's action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
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interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; accord State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 
435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As to the first prong, a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if 
the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 
792 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the case at bar, Mr. Pino was originally detained 
because his vehicle was not properly registered. Mr. Pino's initial detention appears to be 
justified. 
As to the second prong, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to 
and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.5" State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 763 (19919) (quoting Teiry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
During a routine traffic stop, an officer may '"briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while 
he examines the vehicle registration and driver's license.'" State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). The officer may also 
conduct a computer check for outstanding warrants. See State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 
280 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Once the purpose of the initial stop is effectuated, the detained 
individuals must be allowed to proceed on their way, unless further investigation is "supported 
by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 
435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the present case, Officer Hughes discovered that Mr. Pino was driving without a valid 
drivers license and insurance. It does not appear, however, that Officer Hughes suspected Mr. 
Pino was engaged in any additional criminal activity. Officer Hughes informed Mr. Pino that he 
would be cited for the traffic violations and allowed to leave; his vehicle, however, would be 
impounded. Officer Hughes informed Mr. Pino that he could remove and take with him items 
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from the vehicle he didn't want impounded. Officer Hughe's actions to this point were 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified Mr. Pino's original and continued 
detention. 
Once Officer Hughes finished filling out the citation, Mr. Pino began to collect items he 
intended to leave with, including a black gym bag. At that point, Officer Robinson arrived and 
approached Mr. Pino. Officer Robinson discussed with Mr. Pino, for several minutes, "whether 
or not he was still involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine." PHT, 28. Mr. Pino 
responded that he "had put all of that behind him and he was no longer doing that." PHT, 28. 
Officer Robinson then observed the black bag Mr. Pino had removed from his vehicle and asked 
Mr. Pino if he could search it 
In State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court held that a similar 
inquiry exceeded the scope of detention for a routine traffic stop. In Ziegleman, the defendant 
was stopped by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper due to speeding. The defendant provided the 
trooper a valid drivers license but could not produce vehicle registration. The defendant 
explained to the trooper that the vehicle belonged to a friend. The defendant eventually produced 
insurance information that identified the vehicle's owner, which was confirmed by the trooper 
through dispatch. Nevertheless, the trooper suspected the vehicle was stolen. The trooper then 
asked whether any weapons or narcotics were in the vehicle, and after the suspect denied their 
presence, requested consent to search. The defendant consented and a search of the suspect's 
vehicle uncovered contraband. The court determined that, under the circumstances, the officer's 
question concerning narcotics or weapons in the defendant's car was illegal because it extended 
the length or duration of the detention beyond what was justified during a routine traffic stop. 
See 905 P.2d at 887; See also United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding 
5 
officer's continued detention of the defendant beyond the time required to receive Ihe 
information needed to issue a speeding citation constituted an unreasonable seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
In the case at bar, officer Robinson's actions not only lengthened the duration of Mr. 
Pino's detention, they extended its scope. Article I, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment does 
not simply limit the "length" or "duration" of a seizure, it limits the "scope" as well. See 805 
P.2d at 763 (holding "length" and "scope" of Fourth Amendment seizure must be strictly tied to 
and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible). Mr. Pino was 
originally stopped due to a vehicle registration violation. Further inquiry revealed that Mr. Pino 
had neither a valid drivers license, nor current insurance. However, once officer Hughes finished 
filling out the citation for the various traffic violations, Mr. Pino should have been provided a 
copy of the citation, and allowed to gather his things and leave. Instead, Officer Robinson 
questioned Mr. Pino at length about whether he was still using or distributing drugs. What 
should have been limited to a routine traffic stop and vehicle impound, turned into a fishing 
expedition for drugs, unjustified by the circumstances that rendered Mr. Pino's detention 
permissible. 
The State will likely argue that the discovery of contraband in Mr. Pino's gym bag and on 
his person was lawfully pursuant to Mr. Pino's consent. As in Ziegleman, however, Mr. Pino's 
alleged consent to search was obtained through the exploitation of illegal questions concerning 
contraband; questions that unjustifiably lengthened the duration and extended the scope of Mr. 
Pino's detention. See 905 P.2d at 887 (holding "[although defendant's consent was voluntary m 
fact, it was obtained through the exploitation of the trooper's illegal question of whether 
defendant had any narcotics or weapons in his car"); See also State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 
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1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding search following a consent is invalid if consent was obtained 
by police exploitation of the prior illegality). Consequently, the contraband discovered following 
Mr. Pino's consent to search, and statements he made following his unlawful arrest must be 
suppressed. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (holding exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution). 
The State might also attempt to justify officer Robinson's actions by arguing that he 
suspected Mr. Pino was under the influence of drugs and/or was in possession of a dangerous 
weapon. Any suspicion that Mr. Pino was engaged in criminal activity more serious than traffic 
violations was unreasonable and did not justify lengthening and extending the scope of Mr. 
Pino's detention. See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
further investigative detention "must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity"). Blood shot, glazed eyes and calm, cooperative behavior, without more, 
would not lead a reasonable officer to suspect the influence of drugs. See State v. Lovegren, 829 
P.2d 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding driver's evasive behavior when questioned, and blood 
shot eyes did not provide reasonable suspicion for detention exceeding scope of traffic stop). 
Furthermore, a search for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, is justified only when the 
detaining officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that [a] suspect is armed and presently 
dangerous." 392 U.S. at 21, 23 (emphasis added). Officer Robinson failed to articulate any facts 
that would lead a reasonable officer to suspect Mr. Pino was then "presently" armed and 
dangerous. In fact, throughout the police encounter, Mr. Pino was calm and cooperative; such 
behavior should have dispelled any suspicion that Mr. Pino posed a threat. 
CONCLUSION 
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Officer Robinson's inquiry concerning Mr. Pmo's use or distribution of drugs both 
lengthened the duration of his detention and extended its scope. Because the length and scope of 
the detention was not strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible, and because it was not justified by any reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
more serious criminal activity, Mr. Pino's continued detention was unreasonable under article I, 
section 14 of Utah's constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Mr. Pino's consent 
to search was the result of police exploitation of a prior illegality, and therefore invalid. For the 
foregoing reasons, the discovered contraband and statements made following Mr. Pino's arrest 
must be suppressed. 
Dated this <^ < day of March 2000. 
V 
David S. Sturgill 
Counsel for Eric Pino 
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